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Abstract
Researchers studying curiosity and interest note a lack of consensus in whether and how
these important motivations for learning are distinct. Empirical attempts to distinguish them
are impeded by this lack of conceptual clarity. Following a recent proposal that curiosity and
interest are folk concepts, we sought to determine a non-expert consensus view on their
distinction using machine learning methods. In Study 1, we demonstrate that there is a
consensus in how they are distinguished, by training a Naïve Bayes classification algorithm
to distinguish between free-text definitions of curiosity and interest (n = 396 definitions) and
using cross-validation to test the classifier on two sets of data (main n = 196; additional n =
218). In Study 2, we demonstrate that the non-expert consensus is shared by experts and can
plausibly underscore future empirical work, as the classifier accurately distinguished defi-
nitions provided by experts who study curiosity and interest (n = 92). Our results suggest a
shared consensus on the distinction between curiosity and interest, providing a basis for
much-needed conceptual clarity facilitating future empirical work. This consensus distin-
guishes curiosity as more active information seeking directed towards specific and previ-
ously unknown information. In contrast, interest is more pleasurable, in-depth, less
momentary information seeking towards information in domains where people already have
knowledge. However, we note that there are similarities between the concepts, as they are
both motivating, involve feelings of wanting, and relate to knowledge acquisition.
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Introduction
Engaging with material by generating “how” and “why” questions and seeking answers
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information seeking have commonly been described in terms of our curiosity and interest
(Berlyne, 1949, 1950). Highlighting the potential value for learning, studies show that we
recall information better when we are more curious about, or interested in it (Berlyne, 1954;
Fastrich et al., 2018; Garner et al., 1991), and that curiosity elicits activation in brain areas
associated with learning and memory consolidation (Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009;
Marvin & Shohamy, 2016; Mullaney et al., 2014). Accordingly, pedagogic researchers
emphasise the need to nurture students’ curiosity and interest (Muis et al., 2018), in light of
positive effects on academic achievement and engagement (Harackiewicz et al., 2012;
Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009; Shah et al., 2018).
However, researchers studying curiosity and interest note a lack of consensus in how these
important concepts are distinguished from one another (e.g. Peterson & Hidi, 2019). In early
research the terms were often used interchangeably or synonymously (Berlyne, 1949, 1950;
Day, 1982; though Berlyne’s position changed in subsequent publications). This initial lack of
conceptual clarity led to divergence in how they were investigated, conceptualised and
represented that persists to the present day (Murayama, 2019). While some maintain that the
terms can be used interchangeably (there is no evidence to suggest they represent distinct
psychological processes; Silvia, 2006; see also Litman & Silvia, 2006 for discussion), others
argue that they should not (representing distinct processes; Grossnickle, 2016; Hidi &
Renninger, 2019; Markey & Loewenstein, 2014). Practically, it is non-trivial to provide
much-needed conceptual clarity of terminology, particularly in educational contexts (Marsh
et al., 2003). If curiosity and interest represent different underlying psychological processes,
they may affect learning outcomes differently, impacting on academic interventions and wider
pedagogical practice.
Complicating the task of delineating the terms, modern frameworks outline dimensions of
curiosity (for reviews, see Grossnickle, 2016; Loewenstein, 1994) and interest (Renninger &
Hidi, 2016) that describe conceptually similar concepts called “curiosity” or “interest” (e.g.
epistemic curiosity and situational interest), or treat interest as a dimension of curiosity (e.g.
interest-type curiosity; Litman, 2019). Further, neuroscientists and computational modellers
tend to focus on curiosity alone (e.g. Gottlieb et al., 2013; Kang et al., 2009; Kidd & Hayden,
2015; Lau et al., 2020), while educational researchers tend to focus on interest (e.g. Renninger
& Hidi, 2016). This “conceptual gap” may simply result from siloed research traditions
preferring different terminology (resulting from neuroscientists’ agnosticism on differences;
see Kidd & Hayden, 2015) instead of critical theoretical distinctions.
In the current paper, we aim to provide a basis for conceptual clarity to complement theoretical
work and facilitate future empirical work. Following in-depth theoretical review, we investigate
whether there is a consensus that curiosity and interest are distinct (amongst non-experts) and
what the nature of these distinctions are (Study 1). We then determine to what extent this non-
expert consensus is shared by expert researchers (Study 2), assessing whether the consensus
produces meaningful distinctions that can facilitate future empirical investigations.
Curiosity and Interest: Review of the Theoretical Literature
Major Theoretical Frameworks
Existing theoretical frameworks emerge from two broadly siloed lines of research; one into
curiosity, the other into interest. Despite obvious relationships between them, the two lines
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have been developed independently with independent theoretical frameworks (Murayama,
2019). In separately describing the main theoretical frameworks, we simply reflect their
historical separation: we do not presuppose that such frameworks necessarily describe different
psychological processes.
Curiosity
Curiosity is characterised as a multidimensional concept (e.g. diversive/specific, see
Loewenstein, 1994), with scope for broad definition (e.g. encompassing all information-
seeking behaviour, from seeking answers to trivia questions to infants’ bias towards attending
to high contrast images, motion onset and faces; see Kidd & Hayden, 2015). One key
dimension concerns trait/state distinctions: state curiosity refers to momentary experiences
triggered in particular situations by one’s environment (e.g. curiosity is piqued) whereas trait
curiosity refers to a general tendency towards engaging in those experiences (e.g. a curious
person, Grossnickle, 2016). A prominent conceptualisation of state curiosity is the
information-gap theory (Loewenstein, 1994; Markey & Loewenstein, 2014), where someone
becomes aware of a gap between what they know and do not know, and experiences a strong
desire for closure, resulting in information-search. This holds that curiosity arises from
incongruity, and is a drive like hunger or drive for sex. Underscoring drive-based theories,
food and information stimulate the same neurological reward centres (Lau et al., 2020).
Analogous to sex drive, curiosity can dissipate if people are distracted, and lack of satiation
does not cause death (Shin & Kim, 2019). Like other drives, curiosity may not be rational;
potentially driving people to seek information with negative consequences (FitzGibbon et al.,
2021).
Another framework proposes two types of curiosity; a feeling of deprivation when infor-
mation gaps are present (D-type) and a feeling of interest in learning something new (Litman
& Jimerson, 2004). Using psychometric measures, this framework emphasises relatedness
between trait forms of I- and D-type curiosity as both are linked to desiring and seeking
information (see Litman, 2019 for a review). However, while I-type curiosity corresponds with
exploring new things for pleasure, D-type corresponds with urgent acquisition of specific
knowledge. Trait curiosity levels (i.e. how people “generally feel” a certain way) are self-
reported in response to items, e.g. “I enjoy exploring new ideas” (I-type, from the Epistemic
Curiosity scale; Litman & Spielberger, 2003) or “don’t like not knowing/try to learn about
complex topics” (D-type, from the Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation scale; Litman &
Jimerson, 2004). Following state-trait theory (Spielberger, 1972) individuals high in I/D-type
curiosity traits experience the related I/D-type state curiosity more intensely compared to
individuals with low trait levels (Litman et al., 2005). Although this theoretical distinction
captures two distinct aspects of information-seeking behaviour, some researchers question
whether I-type curiosity should simply be considered interest, and D-type considered curiosity,
instead of both being labelled as sub-types of curiosity (Hidi & Renninger, 2019; Renninger &
Hidi, 2016).
Interest
A second line of research focuses on interest, with prominent frameworks also positing
momentary and long-term forms (Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Krapp, 2000). Situational interest
(e.g. focused attention triggered by environmental stimuli) is distinguished from individual
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interest (e.g. a predisposition to reengage with a subject; Renninger & Hidi, 2016). Theories of
interest often propose developmental accounts of how a person moves from situational to
individual interest in a topic, and the relationships between situational and individual interest
(e.g. Krapp, 2007; Schiefele, 2009). The most prominent theory proposes a four-phase model
of interest development (Hidi & Renninger, 2006). Under this model, situational interest is
initially environmentally triggered (e.g. on noticing incongruous information/recognising
personal relevance), then maintained by focused attention towards that subject. Individual
interest can emerge from situational interest when developing predispositions to reengage with
a subject become fully-fledged. However, situational interest can occur after individual interest
has developed; they are phases not unidirectional developmental stages.
Other theories of interest (see Renninger & Hidi, 2011 for a review) distinguish one’s
interest (i.e. part of an emotional experience and momentary motivation), and one’s interests
(i.e. part of personality, individual differences, and idiosyncratic hobbies; Silvia, 2006). This
conception treats interest as a basic motivating emotion (like happiness, fear or anger) but one
that is adapted for engagement with a stimuli/topic (Silvia, 2001). Notably, under this account,
interest is considered separate from simple enjoyment, while other accounts equate interest
directly with enjoyment of activities (Wigfield et al., 2007).
Proposed Distinctions Between Curiosity and Interest
Disentangling curiosity from interest is complicated because frameworks describe heteroge-
neous and multidimensional concepts. Accordingly, lines demarcating certain dimensions may
not demarcate others. For example, distinguishing long-term forms (proposed by above
frameworks) is straightforward; while trait curiosity refers to one’s general disposition to
experience state curiosity, individual interest refers to one’s disposition to engage with
information in particular domains (Ainley, 2019; Grossnickle, 2016). In contrast, situational
interest and state curiosity (including I/D-type state curiosity) are clearly closely related (both
are motivated searches for information triggered by environmental stimuli) and are perhaps
indistinguishable (Silvia, 2006). However, the simplicity of this particular trait-level distinction
does not necessarily mean that all trait-level distinctions are straightforward. When traits are
conceived of as tendencies to experience corresponding state-level forms (i.e. to experience
state curiosity/situational interest), this requires state-level distinctions. In this section, we
outline five distinctions between state-level interest and curiosity proposed by researchers who
maintain that the concepts are meaningfully separable.
Triggers
Some researchers argue that while triggering curiosity requires only what Berlyne (1960)
termed “collative variables”, disequilibrium-inducing stimuli that lead a person to perceive an
information gap (e.g. stimuli involving novelty, complexity, conflict/incongruity, surprise and
uncertainty), interest is triggered by a broader range of variables (Ainley, 2019; Grossnickle,
2016; Renninger & Hidi, 2016). Interest triggers are not necessarily universal, and could be
subjective (Renninger et al., 2019), though death, sex and power could be universally
interesting (for a review of text-based triggers, see Renninger & Hidi, 2016). Shin and Kim
(2019) suggest that well-organised informationally-complete material including availability of
choice, relevance, praise and social interaction can trigger interest, while incomplete informa-
tion rife with information gaps can trigger curiosity.
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Characterisation of Information Seeking
The character of information-search following triggering of curiosity and interest may differ,
as differing search goals influence how the search is conducted. Curiosity is goal-directed
towards closing an information gap, ceasing on acquisition of the specific information required
to close it, while interest is goal-directed towards engagement with information more gener-
ally, and therefore does not necessarily cease on information acquisition (Grossnickle, 2016;
Markey & Loewenstein, 2014; Shin & Kim, 2019). The I/D-type curiosity framework makes a
similar distinction; D-type curiosity (information-gap curiosity) represents “need to know”
information, whereas I-type (feeling of interest) represents more relaxed “take it or leave it”
approaches (Litman, 2005).
Due to differing goals, interest states may last longer. Renninger and Hidi (2016) argue that
while curiosity is short-lived (yoked to information gaps) interest has unlimited duration, as the
primary goal is engagement. Curiosity, as an urgent desire to close information gaps and
resolve feelings of deprivation, necessarily involves briefer information seeking as a result of
the urgency combined with “stopping rules” (i.e. curiosity ceases when specific information is
gained). When experiencing interest, people do not urgently want resolution, and lack stopping
rules for information seeking.
Knowledge States
Curiosity and interest may be distinguished by a person’s beliefs about their existing knowl-
edge relating to the topic of the information search. Curiosity, based on recognition of
information gaps, may only be triggered when someone knows enough about a topic to
recognise a relevant gap, but not so much that they think there is no gap (Loewenstein,
1994; Metcalfe et al., 2020; Shin & Kim, 2019). Studies propose an inverted U-shaped curve
in people’s feelings of curiosity predicted by their perceived knowledge about a topic (Gruber
et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009; Litman et al., 2005). This does not apply to interest (but see
Fastrich & Murayama, 2020), so curiosity may be distinguished from interest by how much
knowledge someone believes they have regarding a specific stimulus. If information seeking is
in response to a stimulus that someone believes that they know nothing or lots about (e.g. it is
one of their individual interests) perhaps they are experiencing interest, whereas if in response
to a stimulus that they believe they know something but not everything about, they could be
experiencing curiosity or interest (Grossnickle, 2016; Hidi & Renninger, 2019). This facet also
distinguishes I/D-type curiosity (Litman, 2019; Litman et al., 2005); when people believe that
they “don’t know” an answer to a question, the intensity of their curiosity is predicted by I-type
trait measures (i.e. their disposition to search for information for pleasure). However, when
they feel that the answer is on the tip of their tongue, intensity is predicted by D-type trait
measures (i.e. their disposition to seek gap-closing information).
Affect
Curiosity and interest might be affectively distinct. While curiosity is initially aversive (due to
feelings of deprivation), then pleasant when resolved (due to feelings of reward; Jepma et al.,
2012), interest is generally thought to be pleasant from the point of triggering (Markey &
Loewenstein, 2014; Schiefele, 2009; Shin & Kim, 2019; Silvia, 2006). Information-search
motivated by individual interests is more likely to be pleasant as it arises from pursuit of
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information in areas that people already find rewarding (Renninger & Hidi, 2016). D-type trait
curiosity measures are positively associated with anxiety, depression and anger and measures
indicating discomfort or frustration; while I-type trait measures are unrelated (or negatively
associated) with negative affect traits and positively associated with enjoyment (Litman, 2008;
Litman & Jimerson, 2004). Given that trait-intensity predicts state-intensity, D-type curiosity
(feeling of deprivation) is more aversive, while I-type curiosity (feeling of interest) is more
enjoyable.
Incentive Salience
Different neurological processes could underpin curiosity and interest (Shin & Kim, 2019).
Under the incentive-salience system, “wanting”, linked to mesolimbic dopamine receptors and
characterised by behavioural approach and the experience of desire, is distinct from “liking”,
linked to opioid receptors and characterised as experiences of pleasure (and further, both are
distinct from a predictive learning component; Berridge, 2012). While the “wanting” and
“liking” processes often work together (e.g. wanting and liking the same reward), they can be
dissociated by manipulation of dopamine; impacting the wanting, but not liking system (see
Berridge & Robinson, 1998 for a review). Litman et al. (2005); Litman (2019) proposed that
while both I- and D-type curiosity involve “liking”, experiencing pleasure when information is
obtained (albeit less intensely for I-type), D-type involves higher levels of initial “wanting”.
FitzGibbon et al. (2020) argue that incentive-salience is a purely motivational urge, accounting
for the seductive lure of curiosity, i.e. the desire to irrationally seek information with negative
consequences (FitzGibbon et al., 2021; Hsee & Ruan, 2016; Oosterwijk, 2017).
How to Empirically Test Theoretical Distinctions?
According to proposed theoretical distinctions (reviewed above) curiosity and interest may
be triggered by different types of stimuli, characterised by different forms of information
search (with differing durations), distinguished by a person’s beliefs about their own
knowledge, affectively distinct, and underpinned by different neurological processes.
But how can we complement this theoretical analysis and empirically examine whether
distinguishing these concepts is useful or redundant? Although empirical research is
lacking, we identify two approaches by which evidence might be obtained: top-down
and bottom-up.
Top-down approaches initially define curiosity and interest based on a certain theoretical
perspective (or convenience) and then either measure peoples’ curiosity and interest (e.g. using
self-report) or implement a manipulation based on these definitions. Then researchers examine
distinctiveness by testing whether they differently predict some outcome variable. One recent
example of this approach found distinct predictive validity for curiosity and interest on recall
(McGillivray et al., 2015), suggesting potential evidence consistent with the claim that
curiosity and interest represent separate psychological processes. In this study, a measure of
curiosity (self-reported on a 10-point scale from “not at all curious” to “extremely curious”)
was taken prior to the answer to a trivia question being revealed, while an interest measure
(“not interesting at all” to “extremely interesting”) was taken after revealing the answer (see
also Fandakova & Gruber, 2021). Measures of interest (not curiosity) predicted recall for trivia
question answers in adults after an hour and a week delay.
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While top-down approaches are promising, distinctions between curiosity and interest are
considerably constrained by the theoretical perspective taken and assessment methods used.
Top-down approaches can suffer from construct underrepresentation of the two broad concepts
(Downing, 2002; Messick, 1995; Spurgeon, 2017). For example, McGillivray et al., (2015)
assessed curiosity and interest using single items simply asking how curious/interested
participants were about an answer. While this study demonstrated potential differential
predictive utility of these measures on recall, such an assessment cannot reveal broad,
impactful distinctions between curiosity and interest pertinent to the broader discussion about
distinguishing the terms (which was also not the aim of this study). The evidence for
separation may simply reflect a distinction based on linguistic use of the terms (curiosity
referring to future knowledge gain, interest referring to knowledge gained; see Silvia, 2006).
Another problem is that the same assessment may be interpreted differently, depending on
researchers’ theoretical perspective. Measures referred to as curiosity and interest (Fandakova
& Gruber, 2021; McGillivray et al., 2015) are elsewhere called pre-answer and post-answer
interest (Fastrich et al., 2018). As we lack consensus on how we should define curiosity and
interest separately, top-down approaches risk underrepresenting the rich and broad concepts of
curiosity and interest, and overlook important aspects suggested by other theoretical
perspectives.
Bottom-up approaches represent another way to examine distinctions. These do not impose
top-down definitions, instead allowing definitions to be data-driven, analysing how partici-
pants’ responses to different measures cluster together (i.e. using factor-analytic approaches).
For example, analysing whether specific items from existing survey measures (of curiosity,
interest, or information seeking more broadly) cluster together onto one or more factors. If they
form two separable factors that could meaningfully be labelled “curiosity” or “interest” then
the concepts should be meaningfully distinguished. However, if they form only one factor then
they may be practically indistinguishable. Litman (2008) applied this approach to trait-level
survey measures of curiosity and interest (the 10-item Epistemic Curiosity scale and 15-item
Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation scale, see above), identifying two factors across 25
items, providing evidence consistent with there being two separable processes (one related to
pleasure associated with discovery of new ideas, the other to spending time/effort to seek
specific information). More recently, Schmidt and Rotgans (2020) applied this approach to
state-level measures. They informed students (aged 12-13) that they would be taught about a
topic, and collected their responses to 10 items measuring epistemic curiosity (e.g. “I would
like to explore this topic in depth”) and situational interest (e.g. “I enjoy working on this
topic”) constructed through content analysis of previously published measures. These state-
level measures of curiosity and interest were best explained by a single factor (the constructs
were near-perfectly correlated in a two-factor solution).
While also promising, these bottom-up approaches are limited in three ways. Firstly, the
lack of prior conceptual clarity in labelling factors inherent in this approach makes it difficult
to interpret the results. For example, Litman (2008) described both factors as curiosity
(interest-type and deprivation-type), whereas others might simply describe them as interest
and curiosity. Secondly, these approaches are mainly based on between-person analyses of the
relation between measures of curiosity and interest, not within-person analyses (Murayama
et al., 2017). Between-person analyses show whether individuals who score highly on
measures of epistemic curiosity also score highly on measures of situational interest compared
to other people. However, this is independent of questions asked by within-person analyses;
namely how curiosity and interest might covary over time for a person (i.e. to what extent they
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are psychologically distinct for a person). Simply, if factor analysis suggests some factor
structure for measures of curiosity and interest based on individual differences, it is not
necessarily the case that the same structure accounts for mental categories within individuals
(see also Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998 for similar arguments relating to personality). Finally,
bottom-up approaches are limited by item design. For example, Schmidt and Rotgans (2020)
used 10 items, three simply asked whether students were curious/interested (or lacked curios-
ity) in the topic; offering no clarification on the nature of differences between curiosity and
interest. Therefore, there is still an element of top-down design in bottom-up approaches, with
associated risks of construct underrepresentation, limiting the range of distinctions that can be
tested to those captured by items used.
Current Research
The purpose of the current research is to provide a much-needed basis for conceptual clarity by
extending bottom-up approaches to address limitations of previous investigations. Specifically,
we use novel techniques to seek a “consensus view” on what makes curiosity and interest
different, that can plausibly underscore empirical investigations into whether they represent
separate psychological processes, and complement prior theoretical analysis of distinctions.
We therefore present a new empirical approach to advance theoretical conceptualisations about
curiosity and interest.
This idea is motivated by the reward-learning framework of knowledge acquisition, which
argues that curiosity and interest represent distinct experiences emerging from the knowledge
acquisition process (Murayama, 2019; Murayama et al., 2019). Under this account, curiosity
and interest are commonsense (also termed naïve or folk) psychological concepts, intuitively
and subjectively constructed by people to describe feelings resulting from underlying psycho-
logical processes to which they lack true introspective access. Thus, while we cannot currently
make hard distinctions between curiosity and interest at the level of specific psychological or
neural processes (see Hidi & Renninger, 2019 for further discussion on this issue), the
framework supposes that people can define them due to distinct experiences of knowledge
acquisition they label “curiosity” and “interest”. The framework therefore posits that curiosity
and interest can be distinguished in terms of a consensus view.
To address this hypothesis, we investigate if there is a detectable consensus on how
curiosity and interest differ. We look for distinguishing characteristics of free-text definitions
of curiosity and interest provided by a large sample of non-expert participants. Instead of scale
responses to survey items, we use free-text responses to open questions (e.g. “Define curiosity/
interest”). Participants can respond in their own words and appeal to any aspects of curiosity or
interest they deem relevant, allowing us to sample a wide range of potential distinctions. Our
approach therefore extends previous bottom-up approaches. Bottom-up approaches in princi-
ple represent a good starting point for the current project, as unlike top-down approaches, they
do not initially rely on prior definition of the terms. This is important to the current work,
because of the lack of widely agreed-upon distinctions between the terms (especially across the
two research domains). However, we extend on these bottom-up approaches by addressing
their limitations in answering the current question (described above). Firstly, we avoid the
problem of researchers’ subjective labelling of the constructs by defining the concepts
according to a consensus view. Secondly, we avoid the problem of distinctions based on
between-subject comparisons by not basing our approach on differences between individuals
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(participants provide both curiosity and interest definitions). Finally, we address the problem
of construct underrepresentation by not using restrictive survey items.
Of course, simply demonstrating that people define curiosity and interest differently is not
evidence that they are underpinned by separate psychological processes. However, this
approach provides an attractive conceptual starting point (i.e. by providing agreed-upon
definitions of curiosity and interest) that facilitates empirical investigation into whether there
are distinct psychological processes in knowledge acquisition. For example, if our extended
bottom-up approach distinguishes peoples’ feelings of curiosity from interest, then this can
facilitate future top-down approaches. One could use conceptualisations established through
our bottom-up approach to design different stimuli that elicit feelings of curiosity and feelings
of interest. Then one could test if there is different predictive validity of these types of stimuli
on recall or perhaps even neuroscientific or other physiological measures, e.g. pupil dilation
(Brod & Breitwieser, 2019). To ensure that the results obtained in the current approach are
applicable to scientific research, we conduct a second study (Study 2) examining whether non-
expert consensus definitions of curiosity and interest reasonably capture distinctions made by
experts in psychological sciences. This way, we hope to provide conceptual clarity on the
terms (determining the nature of the consensus view on how they are distinct) that facilitates
future work on curiosity and interest.
This approach is related to, but distinct from work that investigates how non-expert
commonsense (naïve or folk) understanding of scientific phenomena align with expert scien-
tific understanding (see Gelman & Noles, 2011 for a review). For example, work investigating
students’ commonsense understanding of how objects remain still demonstrates common
misconceptions about gravity requiring attention from instructors (Minstrell, 1982). Or relat-
edly, work demonstrating that commonsense concepts about motion hamper students learning
about Newtonian physics (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; see also McCloskey, 1983). Under this
approach, commonsense understanding is a useful tool for researchers to investigate knowl-
edge development; commonsense understanding can be contrasted against an agreed-upon
gold standard of understanding, e.g. children’s intuitive understanding of contamination can be
compared to biologically correct explanations of contamination (Legare et al., 2009). How-
ever, our approach is different, as there are no agreed-upon expert definitions of curiosity and
interest in the literature with which to compare commonsense understanding. In contrast, the
reward-learning framework proposes that because curiosity and interest are labels that people
assign to their own experiences of information seeking, that people’s commonsense view
could instead serve as a basis for an agreed-upon definition that can help the field to advance.
In this sense, it is more appropriate to determine whether non-expert definitions are shared by
experts (i.e. use the non-expert view as the reference category) to determine if the non-expert
consensus can plausibly be used by experts in research.
While free-text responses provide richer data than scale responses, manually processing
them is problematic. Critically, in seeking aspects of definitions delineating curiosity and
interest, researchers may introduce their own bias, based on personal conceptions of the terms.
Instead, we avoid manual coding, employing algorithm-based (Naïve Bayes classifier) ma-
chine learning techniques. Naïve Bayes classifiers have been used to automatically categorise
texts in diverse contexts, determining authorship (Airoldi et al., 2006; Clement & Sharp, 2003;
Malyutov, 2005; Mosteller & Wallace, 1963; Thisted & Efron, 1987), sentiment (Go et al.,
2009; Greaves et al., 2013; Hawkins et al., 2016; Pang et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2012),
author’s mental health (Al-Mosaiwi & Johnstone, 2018a, 2018b), and in early detection of
pandemics (Alemi et al., 2012; Chapman et al., 2004, 2005; Wilcox & Hripcsak, 1999).
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Using a Naïve Bayes classifier, we look for distinguishing characteristics of people’s
definitions of curiosity and interest. In Study 1, we train a classifier to accurately recognise
characteristics (i.e. words used) of free-text definitions of curiosity and interest (provided by
participants online). On demonstrating the classifier’s generalisability (through cross-valida-
tion), we determine what the distinctions are, inspecting words used by the classifier to
distinguish curiosity and interest definitions. We then determine if these are meaningful and
make inferences about how people delineate the terms. Although Naïve Bayes classifiers are
not highly sophisticated algorithms, their simplicity, and ability to “show their workings”
makes them especially well-suited to the current task.
Study 1
The reward-learning framework holds that the terms curiosity and interest are not interchange-
able, as people have different definitions, constructed subjectively to describe different
experiences of the knowledge acquisition process. If this is correct, then a classifier should
be able to distinguish their definitions of the terms at above chance levels. However, if they are
interchangeable, classifier performance should not exceed chance.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited via Prolific Academic for the main data (N = 351 participants, N =
702 definitions; collected August 2019 by ED & KM), and via Mturk for an additional dataset
(N = 120 participants, N = 240 definitions; June-August 2018 by SA, GF & KM; see Aslan
et al., under review). All were over 18 years old and paid £2.00 GBP (Prolific) or $1.00 USD
(Mturk). According to pre-registered exclusion criteria (https://osf.io/r538u), participants were
excluded when they reported learning English after 12 years of age (main, n = 11; additional n
= 2), reported checking the internet or consulting others about their responses (main, n = 30;
additional, n = 8), for not responding in English (main, n = 5) and for responses wholly
unrelated to curiosity or interest (main, n = 8; additional, n = 1). After exclusions, main data
included n = 297 participants (Female = 170, Male = 126, Described differently = 1; Age:M =
29.0, SD = 9.9; Ethnicity: Asian = 14, Black = 3, Describe differently = 4, Mixed ethnicity =
14, Prefer not to say = 3, White = 259), and additional data included n = 109 (Female = 61,
Male = 48; AgeM = 38.8, SD = 10.3; Ethnicity: African = 7, Asian/Pacific = 20, Caucasian =
77, Hispanic = 3, Native American = 1, Other = 1).
Procedure
Participants completed an online survey (implemented using jsPsych, de Leeuw, 2015)
producing two free-text definitions, one of curiosity and one of interest (minimum 80 words
each). Participants were informed we were interested in the similarities/differences in these
terms and there were no right/wrong answers. In the main data, participants were prompted to
simply, “Define curiosity” or “Define interest”. In the additional data, participants were given
an example after this prompt, i.e. “being interested in X” or “being curious about X”. Question
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order (curiosity/interest) was counterbalanced for the main data (curiosity first, n = 155), in the
additional data all participants defined curiosity first. All participants produced separate free-
text responses describing differences and similarities between the terms (not analysed in this
study). Participants in the main data reported how similar curiosity and interest were (5-point
Likert scale: “completely different”, “mostly different”, “somewhat similar, somewhat differ-
ent”, “mostly similar”, “completely similar”). All participants provided demographic informa-
tion: age, gender, highest level of education, ethnicity, age at which they began learning
English.
Analysis
Software Analysis was conducted using R Studio 1.2.1335 (RStudio Team, 2015) running R
3.6.0 (R Core Team, 2015). We used hunspell (Ooms, 2018) and quanteda (Benoit et al.,
2018) packages for text-processing, caret (Kuhn, 2019) and groupdata2 (Olsen, 2019) for
feature selection, the naïve Bayes classifier from naivebayes (Majka, 2019) and conducted
regression analyses using lavaan.survey (Oberski, 2014; which utilises lavaan; Rosseel, 2012).
Data Pre-processing Pre-processing involved converting participants’ free-text definitions to
vectors of words (more specifically word stems, see below), as the unit of analysis. Prior to
analyses, free-text definitions were manually edited to remove unrelated terms. We removed
portions of text (retaining the rest of the definition) when interest was used in the financial/
banking sense (definitions edited in the main data, n = 46; additional data, n = 2) and where
text was a placeholder (e.g. “I don’t know what else to write”; main: curiosity n = 12, interest n
= 8; additional: curiosity n = 2, interest n = 3). We removed phrases deriving from “curiosity
killed the cat”, as this would potentially bias the classifier towards using these terms, which
would not be informative (main, n = 27; additional, n = 7). To ensure consistent classification,
we corrected spelling to British English.
After manual pre-processing, definitions were automatically processed using natural lan-
guage processing techniques. Numbers, punctuation, symbols and common stop words (e.g.
“I”, “and”) were removed (Bollen et al., 2011; Conover et al., 2011) and text made lowercase.
Words were reduced to word stems, e.g. “questioning”, “question” and “questions” stemmed
to “question” (Al-Mosaiwi & Johnstone, 2018a; Gibbons et al., 2017), and word stems
associated with “curiosity” and “interest” (“interest”, “curio”, “curios” and “curious”) were
removed (Go et al., 2009; Ong et al., 2010). Definitions were converted to a document-feature
matrix; each definition (document) was represented as a vector with each element indicating
presence (1) or absence (0) of a word stem (feature) within it.
Overview of Machine Learning Analysis Here we provide a comprehensible overview of our
analysis of for those unfamiliar with machine learning methods. We report detailed method in
the Supplementary Online Materials (SOM), additionally our analysis plan was pre-registered
(https://osf.io/r538u) and analysis code is available at https://osf.io/49ue2/.
Following pre-processing (see above), we trained a Naïve Bayes algorithm to recognise
what word stems were most likely to be present (and absent) in curiosity and interest
definitions, thus learning what a curiosity or interest definition is likely to contain (see
“Classification” in SOM). To do this, the algorithm used labelled definitions (e.g. labelled
“curiosity” or “interest”) to compute the conditional probabilities of word stems being present
(or absent) in curiosity compared to interest definitions (these are inversely related). Through
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feature selection (see “Classifier training” in SOM), we identified only word stems most
clearly related to one definition type over the other, i.e. those with the highest conditional
probability of appearing in curiosity compared to interest definitions (and vice versa). This
process identified a manageable list of word stems (from all words that participants used) that
facilitated reliable discrimination between curiosity and interest definitions.
Simply reporting the computed probabilities for each word stem tells us the unique
characteristics of our data. However, this is less valuable than demonstrating that probabilities
learned from some data can be applied to new data (not used in training) to predict whether it is
a curiosity or interest definition. This can be achieved through a machine-learning technique
called cross-validation (which is analogous to replication). In this instance, cross-validation is a
technique whereby a portion of data is used to train an algorithm to accurately classify that
data, before testing it on separate data to see if it achieves similar accuracy. Cross-validated
results, like replicated findings, are more robust than those observed only once (which may
simply accommodate data exactly and not generalise).
In the current study, we split the main data into a training and test set for cross-
validation (see Fig. 1: Data partition). The training set was used to train the algorithm to
classify curiosity and interest definitions as accurately as possible using a list of word
stems of manageable length (note: feature selection also used a type of cross-validation
during training within the training set; see “Classifier training” in SOM and Fig. 1:
Testing). The test set served as new unseen data to validate (or replicate) that the
characterisation of curiosity/interest definitions learned by the algorithm was applicable
to data not used in training. Testing the algorithm involved determining whether it
accurately predicted the definition type (“curiosity” or “interest”) for unseen definitions
in the test set, based on the conditional probabilities of word stems computed across the
training set. To make its prediction, the algorithm computes the probability that each
definition is of either type (inversely related); the type with a probability > .5 is the
predicted type (see “Classification” in SOM). Thus, accuracy can be absolute (i.e. did the
algorithm correctly predict the definition type), or relative (i.e. the probability computed
for the correct definition type; effectively the certainty of the prediction).
Furthermore, as a more stringent test of the algorithm’s generalisability, we also tested the
algorithm on an additional data set (see Fig. 1: Data). Binomial tests assessed if classifier
absolute accuracy exceeded chance (50% of definitions correctly classified) for both the test
set from the main data, and the additional data (see Fig. 1: Testing).
Predicting Classifier Accuracy from Judgements of Similarities/Differences We were in-
terested in whether participant’s ratings of how similar/different curiosity and interest were
(Likert scale) predicted classifier accuracy (test data only). We considered accuracy as absolute
(binary, i.e. correct classification = 1, incorrect = 0), and relative (continuous, i.e. the
probability of a definition belonging to the correct type, given the word stems the definition
contained). We constructed probit regression models for absolute accuracy, and linear regres-
sion for relative accuracy, with definitions (not participants) as the unit of analysis. To account
for data dependency, we corrected standard errors using lavaan.survey package (Oberski,
2014).
The important predictor was how similar/different participants rated the terms on the Likert
scale. We also included potentially confounding variables as fixed effects, including demo-
graphic variables (age, gender, education and age at which the participant learnt English), and
definition order (curiosity/interest first). Additionally, we included definition type (curiosity/
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interest) and computed the interaction effects between definition type and all other fixed
effects. To aid interpretation, Likert data and age were treated as continuous and mean-centred.
We effect-coded gender (male = -1, female = 1), question order (curiosity first = -1, interest
first = 1) and definition type (curiosity = -1, interest = 1). Additionally, the age at which
participants learnt English and education were treated as binary categorical variables and
effect-coded (English learnt from birth = -1, later = 1; A levels/college as highest educational
level = -1, higher education = 1). Note, models exclude two participants with missing data
(they declined to report education).
Collocations For descriptive purposes, we extracted word collocations (the frequency that
words were collocated with another) for words deriving from word stems. We limited the
search to two-word collocations that had >10 instances across definitions.
Results
The classifier achieved high accuracy during training and in testing. In training, feature
selection identified 42 word stems which accurately distinguished curiosity and interest
definitions in the training data (accurately classifying 87.13% of definitions).
Fig. 1 Process for data partition, training, and testing the classifier
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Importantly, the classifier was also highly accurate in predicting unseen data (Table 1),
accurately predicting the correct definition type significantly above chance for both the
main test data (79.29%; 95% CI: 72.98–84.71%, p < .001) and additional test data
(77.06%; 95% CI: 70.91–82.47%, p < .001). This demonstrates that the classifier
accurately distinguished between definitions of curiosity and interest and this ability
was generalisable to unseen definitions, i.e. not overfit to training data.
Table 2 shows the conditional probabilities for word stems used by the classifier
(calculated from training data). Table 2 is ranked by the absolute difference (largest to
smallest) between P(C = “curiosity”|fk = 1) and P(C = “interest”|fk = 1), with larger
differences indicating more valuable word stems for discriminating between definitions
of curiosity and interest. The most discriminative word stem was “hobbi”; definitions
containing “hobby/hobbies” were more likely to be interest definitions.
Table A1 (Supplementary Online Materials) shows frequent collocations of words
derived from word stems used by the classifier (see Table A2 for complete lists for each
word stem, and prevalence). Inspecting collocations of words gives contextual informa-
tion about how they tended to be used in definitions. The most frequent collocations
involving word stems used by the classifier were “to know” (two-word phrase appearing
in 52.2% of curiosity definitions, and 33% of interest) and “to learn” (33.3% curiosity,
21.9% interest).
Table 3 shows word stems that were not selected, but appeared in >10% of definitions
(see Table A3 for words derived from these stem words, and Table A4 for collocations).
The most common word stems (except derivatives of “curios”, “curious” and “interest”)
were “can”, “want”, “thing” and “feel”. These have no discriminative value despite
frequent occurrence; they can be considered “common features” of curiosity and interest
definitions.
Participants mostly reported that curiosity and interest were “somewhat similar,
somewhat different” (median response, 50.17% participants, Fig. 2). Fewer reported they
were “mostly similar” (35.02%) then “mostly different” (12.46%). Fewest reported they
were “completely similar” (1.01%) or “completely different” (1.35%). We investigated
whether this rating predicted absolute (correct classification or not) and relative accuracy
(predicted probability of the correct class) in the main test data (Table 4), also including
potential confounding variables (see Table A5 for descriptive information). The rating
had no effect on classifier accuracy for either definition type (no main effect on absolute,
b = 0.007, SE = 0.038, z = 0.186, p = .852; relative, b = -0.011, SE = 0.028, z = -0.411, p
= .681; no interaction with definition type on absolute, b = 0.037, SE = 0.048, z = 0.770,
p = .441; relative, b = 0.030, SE = 0.034, z = 0.871, p = .384).
Table 1 Correct classification across datasets and definition type
Dataset Total Curiosity Interest
Study 1
Main test data (n = 99*) 157/198 (79.29%) 74/99 (74.75%) 83/99 (83.84%)
Additional test data (n = 109*) 168/218 (77.06%) 92/109 (84.40%) 76/109 (69.72%)
Study 2
Expert data (n = 47*) 67/92 (72.83%) 29/45 (64.44%) 38/47 (80.85%)
*n refers to participants
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Discussion
We trained a classifier to distinguish participants’ definitions of curiosity and interest, which
performed with above-chance accuracy when tested on unseen data. This demonstrated that the
classifier successfully distinguished most definitions, and moreover that the distinctions used
were generalisable. It also indicates that there are words commonly used by participants that
reliably distinguish definitions of curiosity and interest. Additionally, some words commonly
used by participants to describe curiosity and interest did not reliably distinguish them. Our
Table 2 Conditional probabilities of word stems used by the classifier
Word Stem P(C|fk = 1) (word stem present) P(C|fk = 0) (word stem absent)
C = ”Curiosity” C = “Interest” Predicts C = ”Curiosity” C = “Interest”
hobbi .057 .943 interest .568 .432
spend .069 .931 interest .534 .466
enjoy .103 .897 interest .543 .457
children .852 .148 curiosity .475 .525
ask .811 .189 curiosity .468 .532
satisfi .808 .192 curiosity .479 .521
happen .808 .192 curiosity .479 .521
around .806 .194 curiosity .474 .526
world .804 .196 curiosity .460 .540
human .804 .196 curiosity .460 .540
bad .800 .200 curiosity .480 .520
attent .225 .775 interest .531 .469
question .774 .226 curiosity .458 .542
excit .227 .773 interest .516 .484
anim .773 .227 curiosity .484 .516
involv .231 .769 interest .519 .481
answer .767 .233 curiosity .478 .522
time .276 .724 interest .552 .448
understand .722 .278 curiosity .465 .535
explor .721 .279 curiosity .473 .527
natur .719 .281 curiosity .481 .519
new .697 .303 curiosity .444 .556
alreadi .310 .690 interest .515 .485
desir .674 .326 curiosity .450 .550
inform .667 .333 curiosity .476 .524
sometim .667 .333 curiosity .479 .521
live .667 .333 curiosity .488 .512
see .654 .346 curiosity .477 .523
others .649 .351 curiosity .485 .515
without .643 .357 curiosity .489 .511
go .625 .375 curiosity .486 .514
get .625 .375 curiosity .480 .520
us .618 .382 curiosity .481 .519
subject .385 .615 interest .534 .466
know .606 .394 curiosity .380 .620
find .605 .395 curiosity .456 .544
person .403 .597 interest .555 .445
may .409 .591 interest .528 .472
learn .589 .411 curiosity .431 .569
good .587 .413 curiosity .489 .511
like .435 .565 interest .534 .466
someth .467 .533 interest .604 .396
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results suggest that a shared consensus on the distinctions between curiosity and interest exists.
The exact nature of these distinctions, and their meaningfulness are discussed in the General
Discussion.
Study 2
Study 1 established that non-expert descriptions of curiosity and interest can be distinguished
by a classifier. The purpose of Study 2 is to determine whether experts (i.e. psychologists and
neuroscientists studying curiosity and interest) distinguish between them in line with the non-
expert consensus derived in Study 1, to demonstrate if this consensus can plausibly underscore
future empirical work. We test how the classifier (trained on non-expert definitions in Study 1)
classifies experts’ definitions. Furthermore, we explore what measures of expertise predict
classifier accuracy, to determine if certain research traditions distinguish the terms more in line
with the non-expert consensus than others. This is motivated by Hidi & Renninger et al.
(2019)’s proposal that subscription to the idea that there are distinctions between curiosity and
interest differs across domains; i.e. researchers studying interest (mostly educational psychol-
ogists) are more concerned about distinctions, whilst researchers studying curiosity (mostly
neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists and computational modellers) remain agnostic.
Table 3 Proportion of definitions containing word stems used in 10% of definitions (main data: n = 594), but not
used by the classifier (i.e. common words that represent both curiosity and interest)
Word stem Total Curiosity Interest
interest* 76.8% 55.9% 97.6%
curios* 60.9% 92.9% 29.0%
can 51.9% 49.8% 53.9%
want 49.5% 50.8% 48.1%
thing 49.2% 53.5% 44.8%
curious* 34.8% 57.6% 12.1%
feel 30.1% 27.9% 32.3%
also 29.3% 28.3% 30.3%
peopl 28.3% 25.9% 30.6%
someon 26.8% 19.2% 34.3%
exampl 23.7% 22.2% 25.3%
mean 23.2% 19.9% 26.6%
think 21.7% 24.6% 18.9%
make 21.2% 21.5% 20.9%
knowledg 19.9% 23.6% 16.2%
one 18.7% 18.2% 19.2%
topic 16.7% 13.5% 19.9%
way 15.8% 16.8% 14.8%
differ 15.7% 14.8% 16.5%
just 14.5% 16.2% 12.8%
might 13.1% 11.8% 14.5%
certain 13.0% 12.1% 13.8%
work 13.0% 15.5% 10.4%
defin 11.4% 12.5% 10.4%
even 11.4% 11.1% 11.8%
life 11.4% 12.8% 10.1%
object 10.3% 10.4% 10.1%
motiv 10.1% 9.4% 10.8%
*Word stems explicitly prevented from entering the classifier feature list.
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Fig. 2 Participants reporting how different/similar curiosity and interest are. Top: Non-expert participants from
the main data in Study 1 (n = 297). Bottom: Expert participants from Study 2 (n = 47)
Table 4 Summary of fixed effects from regression models fitting classifier absolute accuracy (probit; 1 =
accurate, 0 = not) or relative accuracy (linear; 0-1) ~ (how similar or different participants think curiosity and
interest are [D/S] + participant age + gender + education + age at which participant learnt English [EA] +
definition order [DO]) * definition type (e.g. curiosity or interest: CI) for the main test data (n = 194 definitions),
with SE corrected to account for data dependency (definitions come from n = 97 participants)
Absolute Accuracy Relative Accuracy
Est SE z p Est SE z p
(Int) 0.791 0.028 28.312 .000 0.736 0.019 38.608 .000
D/S 0.007 0.038 0.186 .852 -0.011 0.028 -0.411 .681
Age -0.002 0.003 -0.706 .480 0.000 0.002 -0.093 .926
EA -0.024 0.030 -0.810 .418 0.003 0.020 0.152 .879
Gender -0.001 0.030 -0.032 .975 -0.012 0.020 -0.584 .559
Education 0.000 0.030 -0.009 .993 0.012 0.021 0.553 .580
DO -0.016 0.027 -0.602 .547 -0.007 0.018 -0.368 .713
CI 0.028 0.029 0.963 .335 0.015 0.022 0.678 .498
D/S*CI 0.037 0.048 0.770 .441 0.030 0.034 0.871 .384
Age*CI -0.004 0.003 -1.034 .301 -0.002 0.003 -0.742 .458
EA*CI -0.079 0.031 -2.549 .011 -0.055 0.024 -2.274 .023
Gender*CI 0.022 0.031 0.717 .473 0.007 0.024 0.276 .782
Education*CI 0.094 0.030 3.173 .002 0.069 0.023 3.063 .002




We contacted academics whom we considered to be experts. This was defined as academics
(PhD/graduate students or inmore advanced positions, e.g. lecturers, professors) who had either
published papers on curiosity or interest (or motivation science more broadly), or attended
relevant recent conferences. We contacted those whomwe could find publicly-available, up-to-
date contact information (N = 288). 51 experts completed the survey (response rate = 17.71%;
collected November 2019-January 2020). Participants were excluded when they reported that
they had checked the internet or consulted others about their responses (n = 1), or reported that
they did not conduct research on a topic related to curiosity or interest (n = 3). After exclusions,
data included n = 47 experts (Female = 28, Male = 19; Age: M = 43.8 years, SD = 10.3;
Ethnicity: Asian = 3, Describe differently = 2, Prefer not to say = 1, White = 41).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Study 1; experts produced free-text definitions of curiosity and
interest (minimum 80 words each). However, we asked them to respond in their capacity as an
expert, as we were interested in their professional opinion. Experts were asked to “Define
curiosity/interest” (counterbalanced: curiosity first, n = 27). Experts reported how similar/
different curiosity and interest were (5-point Likert scale). All provided demographic infor-
mation (age, gender, ethnicity) and information on their expertise; their research domain
(choosing all domains that applied from: cognitive, computational modelling, developmental,
educational, neuroscience, organisational, social/personality or other), time since completing
their PhD, whether they conducted research in curiosity/interest, how many papers they had
published in this area, and what term they used to most frequently represent this research topic
(“curiosity”, “interest”, “used to the same extent/interchangeably”, “rarely or never used”).
Experts reported on a 5-point Likert scale to what extent they considered themselves an expert
in curiosity or interest (“only in curiosity”, “more in curiosity”, “similar expertise in both
curiosity and interest”, “more in interest”, “only in interest”).
Analysis
Data was pre-processed as in Study 1. We removed portions of placeholder text (curiosity
n = 4, interest n = 5) and corrected spelling. The classifier trained in Study 1 was tested on the
expert data (note: two participants declined to give curiosity definitions as it was outside their
expertise, so we only included their interest definitions).
Predicting Classifier Accuracy from Judgements of Similarities/Differences
and Expertise
As in Study 1, we computed absolute and relative classifier accuracy. In addition to expert
ratings of how similar/different curiosity and interest were, we were interested in whether
measures of expertise predicted classifier accuracy. We constructed models using probit
(absolute) and linear regression (relative), with SE corrected for data dependency. The
important predictors were the rating of how similar/different curiosity and interest were, and
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measures of expertise described above. We also aimed to include potentially confounding
demographic variables (age and gender). Some measures were too highly correlated to include
in the same model (see Table A6). Age, number of papers published and time since PhD were
all highly correlated (age/PhD time r = .90; PhD time/papers r = .58; age/papers, r = .47); as
such, we only included papers published as a fixed effect, as this was of most theoretical
interest as an expertise measure. The terms experts used to represent the research topic (treated
as continuous, 1 = curiosity, 2 = interchangeable, 3 = interest, none responded that they did not
use these terms) was highly correlated with expertise reported on the Likert scale (1 = “only in
curiosity” to 5 = “only in interest”, r = .90), so we only included the Likert scale as a fixed
effect, as this measure had more variance. We were primarily interested in comparing
researchers who study curiosity (neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists and computational
modellers) and researchers who study interest (educational psychologists), and so inspected
correlations between experts’ reported research domain and expertise in either curiosity or
interest (reported on the Likert scale) to confirm this approach. Expertise more in curiosity
(signified by negative correlation) was strongly associated with domains of neuroscience
(rpb = -.48) and computational modelling (rpb = -.32), while expertise more in interest (signified
by positive association) was strongly associated with educational psychology (rpb = .55).
While there was weak association between expertise in curiosity and cognitive psychology
(rpb = -.06), cognitive psychology was positively associated with expertise in neuroscience
(rφ = .34) and computational modelling (rφ = .33), and negatively associated with educational
psychology (rφ = -.21). We therefore did not include research domain measures, confirming
that the categories of interest were indicated by the expertise Likert scale. To aid interpretation,
the number of papers published and the two Likert scales (similar/different and expertise),
were treated as continuous variables and mean-centred. Gender, definition order and definition
type were effect-coded as in Study 1.
Comparing Accuracy Across Datasets
We compared classifier accuracy on the expert data to the two test data sets from Study 1. We
considered both absolute and relative accuracy, constructing two different models, with SE
corrected for data dependency. Fixed effects were definition type and dataset (main test,
additional and expert data), and we also included the interaction between fixed effects. To
aid interpretation, definition type was effect-coded (see Study 1), and dataset was
orthogonally-coded (expert vs other data: main = -1, additional = -1, expert = 2; additional
versus main: main = -1, additional = 1, expert = 0).
Results
The classifier accurately predicted expert definitions of curiosity and interest (Table 1),
predicting the correct definition type significantly above chance (72.83%; 95% CI: 62.55–
81.58%, p < .001). This demonstrates that the classifier trained on non-expert data could
accurately distinguish expert definitions.
We investigated whether how similar/different experts reported curiosity and interest were,
the number of papers they had published in curiosity/interest research and their expertise in
curiosity or interest predicted absolute and relative accuracy (Table 5, see Table A7 for
descriptive information on predictors). There was a significant main effect of the number of
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papers published (absolute, b = 0.008, SE = 0.002, z = 3.585, p < .001; relative, b = 0.004,
SE = 0.002, z = 2.020, p = .043). This indicates that the classifier was more accurate for experts
who had published more papers on the topics. There was also a main effect of definition type
(absolute, b = 0.103, SE = 0.047, z = 2.186, p = .029; relative, b = 0.116, SE = 0.032,
z = 3.646, p < .001), and an interaction between expertise and definition type (relative:
b = 0.049, SE = 0.023, z = 2.125, p = .034; though absolute only borderline, b = 0.060,
SE = 0.031, z = 1.916, p = .055). This indicates that the classifier was less accurate for
curiosity definitions (compared to interest) from experts whose expertise is more exclusively in
interest (Fig. 3).
There was no significant effect of how different/similar experts reported that curiosity and
interest were (main effect on absolute, b = -0.022, SE = 0.055, z = -0.410, p = .682; relative,
b = -0.028, SE = 0.044, z = -0.639, p = .523; interaction with definition type on absolute,
b = -0.060, SE = 0.065, z = -0.923, p = .356; relative, b = -0.036, SE = 0.053, z = -0.676,
p = .499). Experts reported that curiosity and interest were “somewhat similar, somewhat
different” (median response, 68.09% participants, Fig. 2). Fewer reported they were “mostly
different” (14.89%) or “mostly similar” (10.64%). Fewest reported they were completely
different (4.26%) or completely similar (2.13%). Compared to non-expert participants (Study
1; response on 5-point Likert scale,M = 3.22, SD = 0.72), experts were significantly less likely
to report that the terms were similar (M = 2.91, SD = 0.72), t(342) = 2.70, p = .009 (Welch’s
two sample t-test).
To examine whether classifier performance differed between experts’ and non-experts’
definitions, we combined the expert data with the two datasets from Study 1, and compared
accuracy (Table 6). Absence of significant main effects of dataset indicated that the classifier
was not significantly more or less accurate for any dataset overall, however, there were
significant interaction effects between dataset and definition type. The classifier was signifi-
cantly less accurate for expert’s curiosity definitions compared to their interest definitions
(significant for relative, b = 0.039, SE = 0.012, z = 3.224, p = .001; non-significant for absolute
accuracy, b = 0.032, SE = 0.017, z = 1.861, p = .063). The classifier was significantly more
Table 5 Summary of fixed effects from regression models fitting classifier absolute accuracy (probit; 1 =
accurate, 0 = not) or relative accuracy (linear; 0-1) ~ (how similar or different experts think curiosity and interest
are [D/S] + papers published + expertise + gender + definition order [DO]) * definition type (e.g. curiosity or
interest: CI) for n = 92 definitions, with SE corrected to account for data dependency (definitions come from n =
47 expert participants)
Absolute Accuracy Relative Accuracy
Est SE z p Est SE z p
(Intercept) 0.708 0.041 17.284 .000 0.673 0.028 24.227 .000
D/S -0.022 0.055 -0.410 .682 -0.028 0.044 -0.639 .523
Papers 0.008 0.002 3.585 .000 0.004 0.002 2.020 .043
Expertise -0.054 0.033 -1.653 .098 -0.032 0.022 -1.468 .142
Gender 0.013 0.043 0.316 .752 0.018 0.029 0.627 .531
DO -0.066 0.047 -1.414 .157 -0.025 0.030 -0.830 .406
CI 0.103 0.047 2.186 .029 0.116 0.032 3.646 .000
D/S*CI -0.060 0.065 -0.923 .356 -0.036 0.053 -0.676 .499
Papers*CI -0.004 0.002 -1.848 .065 0.000 0.002 -0.177 .859
Expertise*CI 0.060 0.031 1.916 .055 0.049 0.023 2.125 .034
Gender*CI -0.058 0.045 -1.274 .203 -0.051 0.029 -1.716 .086
DO*CI 0.022 0.043 0.518 .604 -0.008 0.028 -0.287 .774
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accurate for curiosity definitions compared to interest definitions for participants in the
additional data (absolute, b = -0.060, SE = 0.022, z = -2.752, p = .006; relative, b = -0.040,
SE = 0.016, z = -2.522, p = .012).
Discussion
The classifier trained on non-expert definitions, accurately distinguished expert definitions of
curiosity and interest, performing with above chance accuracy. This indicates that the words
used to distinguish definitions of curiosity and interest by non-experts also reliably distin-
guished expert definitions. This suggests that experts may share the non-expert psychological
consensus on how these terms are distinguished, and demonstrates that the non-expert
consensus view can be used to distinguish between curiosity and interest in academic research.
Fig. 3 Relative classifier accuracy for definitions (n = 92) from experts (n = 47) by expertise. Lines represent
linear coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) extracted from relative accuracy model in Table 5
Table 6 Summary of fixed effects from regression models fitting classifier absolute accuracy (probit; 1 =
accurate, 0 = not) or relative accuracy (linear; 0-1) ~ dataset (expert vs others [Expert], additional versus main
[Add vs main]) * definition type (e.g. curiosity or interest: CI) for n= 508 definitions, with SE corrected to
account for data dependency (definitions come from n = 255 participants)
Absolute Accuracy Relative Accuracy
Est SE z p Est SE z p
(Intercept) 0.762 0.019 40.378 .000 0.718 0.013 56.476 .000
Expert -0.018 0.016 -1.082 .279 -0.017 0.011 -1.606 .108
Ind vs test -0.009 0.019 -0.482 .630 -0.003 0.013 -0.250 .803
CI 0.018 0.021 0.864 .388 0.026 0.015 1.751 .080
Expert*CI 0.032 0.017 1.861 .063 0.039 0.012 3.224 .001
Add vs main *CI -0.060 0.022 -2.752 .006 -0.040 0.016 -2.522 .012
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Experts agreed with non-experts that curiosity and interest were somewhat similar and
somewhat different (but not completely similar or different) but were less likely to report that
they were more similar.
Classification was less accurate for curiosity definitions, particularly for experts who
specialised more in interest research (compared to curiosity research). This could be because
these researchers are more likely to describe curiosity in terms of interest, using similar
language across both definitions, perhaps because they conceptualise curiosity as a special
case of interest. However, how similar or different experts thought the terms were did not
predict classifier accuracy, and there was no correlation between this and area of expertise (see
Table A6).
General Discussion
We constructed a classifier that distinguished between descriptions of curiosity and interest
(from both experts and non-experts) with high accuracy and generalisability. Here, we interpret
the distinctions made by the classifier and discuss whether the distinctions are meaningful.
This is followed by a discussion of similarities that the classifier identified. We then discuss
implications for the reward-learning framework and other theories, and limitations and future
directions.
Interpreting Classifier Distinctions
By inspecting word stems (along with associated words and collocations) used by the
classifier to classify definitions, we can identify and evaluate distinctions the classifier
made between curiosity and interest to determine whether such distinctions are meaning-
ful. To do so, we thematically group features together, and interpret whether they plausibly
represent a consensus view on coherent, meaningful distinctions between curiosity and
interest. As making inferences could be subjective, we limit discussion to reasonably
identifiable themes relating to distinctions made by previous theories about distinctions
(reviewed in the introduction). This has the advantage of further validating how the non-
expert consensus can provide a useful conceptual basis for future academic research.
Along with distinctions between trait-level forms of curiosity and interest, we argue that
the consensus view appeals to distinctions based upon the characterisation of the experi-
ence of information seeking (including duration), some aspects of distinctions around
differing knowledge states, affect and elements of the incentive salience system, but not to
distinctions around triggers. That is to say that there is evidence to suggest a consensus
exists in how feelings of curiosity differ from feelings of interest.
Long-Term and Momentary Dimensions
The classifier demonstrated that distinguishing trait-level forms of curiosity and interest is
more straightforward than distinguishing momentary or state-level forms (as discussed in the
introduction). Interest was distinguished from curiosity most strongly by “hobby”, “spend”,
“time” and “subject”. This reflects peoples’ individual interests, whereupon people return to
specific topics over time; i.e. their interests (Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Silvia, 2006). “Hobby/
hobbies” in particular was often used synonymously with interest (e.g. “someone’s interest is a
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hobby”) and references to spending time were common (e.g. “if you have interest in something
you spend time pursuing that interest”). Participants more often described interest in domain-
specific terms; “subject” was commonly collocated as “particular/certain subject” (although
feature selection did not select “topic” nor “object” despite frequent use). In contrast, curiosity
was distinguished from interest by “world”, “around” and “us” (often collocated together or
with other information-seeking terms, e.g. “we feel driven to explore and learn about the world
around us”, “questioning what goes on around us”). This reflects appeals to the domain-
general trait of inquisitiveness. “Human”, “nature”, “children”, and “anim” were linked to
curiosity, reflecting definitions of trait curiosity, e.g. participants suggested that curiosity is
part of an intrinsic natural endowment, appealing to evolutionary (e.g. “it is a part of human
nature to be curious”, “natural behaviour, shared by human beings and animals”) and
developmental processes (“children are really curious”).
Triggers
While novelty was related uniquely to curiosity, there was no further consensus that
curiosity and interest were distinguished by different triggers. Contrasting claims that
domain-general topics trigger interest (e.g. Ainley, 2019), curiosity was linked more to
domain-general topics (e.g. “world around us”). The range of interest triggers could be so
broad that no critical mass of participants used similar definitions, meaning our method
failed to detect them. However, it is more likely that there is no detectable consensus on
different triggers for curiosity and interest resulting from people’s lack of conscious
awareness of what tends to trigger their curiosity or interest, or because causes are not
typically used in definitions. It is worth noting that previous distinctions based on triggers
are complicated by determining when someone experiences an information gap. While
Shin and Kim (2019) propose that well-organised information triggers interest, it could be
argued that it also triggers curiosity, precisely because such organisation makes informa-
tion gaps more salient. Furthermore, proposed universal interest triggers (e.g. death), could
involve information gaps (death involves a plethora of unknowns) so may pique curiosity
(for a review of potentially different triggers of curiosity and interest see Hidi &
Renninger, 2020).
Characterisation of Information Seeking
The consensus distinguished curiosity and interest through different characterisation of
information seeking. Specifically, curiosity was distinguished by words relating to active
information seeking. Interrogative terms (i.e. “ask”, “question”, “explore”, and “see”;
often collocated together, e.g. “ask questions”) along with terms relating to specific
informational gain, (i.e. “answer”, “inform”, “understand”) were more related to curiosity.
Further, curiosity was distinguished by “desire” and “satisf”, characterising curiosity as a
drive for information (questioning) that needed satisfying (with answers). While
information-seeking terms were more associated with curiosity, they were not absent from
interest definitions. “Know”, “learn” and “find” related more to curiosity, but appeared
frequently in interest definitions in similar collocations (e.g. “to know/learn/find”, “know/
learn more”, “know/learn about” and “find out”). “Knowledg” was not distinctive, sug-
gesting that knowledge is a key component of both curiosity and interest. While both
involve knowledge acquisition (consistent with the reward-learning framework), the
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consensus is that peoples’ experience of curiosity is characterised as more active, urgent
information seeking, requiring satisfaction with specific answers. This fits with previous
research that uniquely links curiosity (or D-type curiosity) with information-gaps
(Grossnickle, 2016; Lau et al., 2020; Litman, 2019; Loewenstein, 1994; Markey &
Loewenstein, 2014; Shin & Kim, 2019).
The consensus may distinguish interest from curiosity as an in-depth, less momentary
experience. “Spend”, “time”, (commonly collocated as “spend time”), “attention” and “involv”
were predictive of interest (e.g. “you want to be more involved with the subject and spend time
on it to understand it even further”, “holds your attention”). This fits with the theory that while
state curiosity is normally short-lived, situational interest can be momentary ormore protracted
(Peterson & Cohen, 2019; Renninger & Hidi, 2016), however this interpretation perhaps
confounds situational interest with individual interest (as discussed above) meaning state-
level distinctions are more ambiguous.
Knowledge States
Curiosity was distinct in that it involved novel information seeking. “New” related to curiosity,
and was commonly collocated as “learn/discover/something new” (e.g. “it is about learning
new things”). “Know” was frequently collocated in curiosity definitions as “don’t know” (e.g.
“curiosity is when you don’t know very much about a particular subject”). In contrast,
“already”, related to interest, and was commonly collocated as “already know” (e.g. “when
you say you're interested it means you already know something about it”). This suggests that
peoples’ experience of curiosity involves a feeling of not knowing some information, and
search for new information, whereas interest involves the feeling of already knowing some-
thing about that information. This supports the view that curiosity (or D-type curiosity)
involves plausibly closeable information gaps, (i.e. believing that information is unknown
but obtainable; Litman, 2019; Loewenstein, 1994; Muis et al., 2018; Shin & Kim, 2019), and
that interest does not (i.e. that information is likely to be linked to their existing knowledge
base; Grossnickle, 2016; Hidi & Renninger, 2019).
The consensus does not explicitly incorporate the U-shaped curve of knowledge (Gruber
et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2009), nor the difference between not knowing and tip-of-the-tongue
states (Litman et al., 2005), which holds that interest (or I-type curiosity) should be associated
with both zero-, and complete-knowledge states.
Affect
The consensus suggested that interest is pleasurable. “Enjoy” (e.g. “enjoy doing”), “excit”
(“excited/exciting”) and “like” (“like to”) related to interest, suggesting interest is more
enjoyable than curiosity. This fits with previous linking of interest (or I-type curiosity) with
positive affect (Litman, 2008; Litman & Jimerson, 2004; Markey & Loewenstein, 2014;
Renninger & Hidi, 2016; Schiefele, 2009; Silvia, 2006). However, the consensus did not
support previous theories about the affective experience of curiosity; namely, initial aversive-
ness (deprivation) then pleasure (satiation). This could be because aversiveness is mild
(Litman & Jimerson, 2004), or variable (Noordewier & van Dijk, 2017), or because people
underestimate how much positive affect they experience after uncertainty (Wilson et al., 2005).
Alternatively, this may result from complexity over ascribing positive or negative affect to
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curiosity, i.e. whether the characterisation of curiosity relates to initial aversiveness or pleasure
accompanying satiation.
Incentive Salience
The consensus did not clearly reflect incentive salience. While “liking” related to interest,
neither “wanting” nor “motiv” (e.g. “motivation”, “motivated”) related to curiosity (despite
frequent use). This contrasts with proposed distinctions that curiosity involves strong feelings
of wanting; motivating information seeking even when cognitive desire for information is low
(FitzGibbon et al., 2020). However, curiosity was distinctly related to “bad”, i.e. curiosity may
lead to bad outcomes (e.g. “through curiosity we can learn some bad things”, “you can make
bad decisions wanting to know about something that might not be a good idea”). Thus, the
consensus may support distinguishing curiosity as involving a motivational urge (i.e. “want-
ing”) when negative outcomes are likely (FitzGibbon et al., 2021; Hsee & Ruan, 2016;
Oosterwijk, 2017).
Common Features of Curiosity and Interest
Up until now, our discussion has focused on potential theoretical differences between curiosity
and interest. Of course, a sizable minority of non-experts (36.03%) believed the terms were
mostly or completely similar. Amongst experts, this tendency was less pronounced (12.77%),
but there are those in the literature who prefer to emphasise their similarities (Berlyne, 1950;
e.g. Silvia, 2006). Indeed, the classifier identified common features of curiosity and interest.
The consensus suggests that both curiosity and interest are related to “want/wanting”, sug-
gesting that curiosity is not exclusively strongly related to “wanting”, despite people being
more likely to describe it in terms of “desire” (see above). Both were described as “feelings”,
reflecting that they are experiential states. Both were described as motivators of action; both
“makes” (e.g. “makes you”, “what makes”) and “motiv” (e.g. “motivation”, “motivates”) were
common features. Finally, the consensus suggests that both are related to knowledge acquisi-
tion, with “knowledge” and “topic(s)” appearing frequently at similar rates in both definitions.
A Basis for Conceptual Clarity
The consensus uncovered here distinguishes curiosity as active information seeking directed
towards specific and previously unknown (novel) information. In contrast, interest was more
pleasurable, in-depth, less momentary information seeking towards information in domains
where people already had knowledge. However, the consensus suggests that the concepts
share many similarities, namely they are both feelings of wanting, motivators, and relate to
knowledge acquisition. Consensus distinctions should be contextualised in the light of this and
the finding that a sizeable minority of non-experts reported that they were more similar than
different. This consensus underpinned expert distinctions of curiosity and interest; the classi-
fier based on non-expert definitions accurately classified experts’ definitions. This suggests
that non-expert distinctions between curiosity and interest map well onto experts’ theoretical
distinctions. Thus the consensus revealed here is plausibly a useful foundation on which to
base future empirical and theoretical work. Further, the substantial consensus between experts
and non-experts provides reassurance that the current debate over distinctions between
curiosity and interest is not a purely theoretical and logistic one couched in academic jargon.
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To some extent, this accords with findings that some commonsense understandings of
concepts are not simply supplanted by expert conceptions, but may exist in parallel (Gelman
& Noles, 2011). However, here we argue further that the commonsense understanding of the
nature of curiosity and interest underlies expert conceptions too, validating our approach of
using commonsense understandings as the basis for conceptual clarity.
Note that we are not arguing that people’s beliefs precisely reflect the true psychological
processes underlying the knowledge acquisition process (Murayama et al., 2019). People lack
the capacity to accurately understand the psychological mechanisms that produce subjective
experiences through introspection (Kihlstrom, 1987; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977); and so intro-
spective reports are not appropriate evidence for delineating the psychological processes
underlying curiosity and interest. However, as the basis for investigating whether curiosity
and interest represent meaningfully distinct processes, the shared consensus provides a clear
starting point. Our bottom-up approach to distinguish curiosity and interest provides defini-
tions that are open to revision, and should prompt work to expedite revision. We hope that our
work facilitates the top-down creation of task-based measures of curiosity and interest using
shared consensus distinctions as a starting point. For example, one could test whether stimuli
that elicit active, more urgent information seeking for specific information (i.e. eliciting
curiosity) predict recall differently to stimuli that elicits more relaxed, pleasurable more in-
depth information seeking (i.e. eliciting interest). In turn, pending availability of task-based
curiosity and interest measures, further bottom-up methods, such as data-driven ontology
approaches (see Eisenberg et al., 2019 on self-regulation; and Frey et al., 2017 on risk
preference) can refine the precise nature (or lack of) distinctions between curiosity and interest.
Curiosity researchers (experts specialising in curiosity) more closely shared the non-expert
consensus than interest researchers; the non-expert consensus did not distinguish interest re-
searchers’ definitions as clearly as curiosity researchers’. This suggests that curiosity researchers
are not agnostic to differences between curiosity and interest, despite using “curiosity” to represent
the entire research domain. However, interest researchersmay have strongly differentiated the terms,
but did not describe curiosity in line with non-expert distinctions, using different terminology
altogether. Alternatively, they may have described curiosity using language associated with interest,
perhaps explicitly referring to interest comparatively to define curiosity.
Practically, our findings support face validity of self-report items measuring curiosity or
interest. This has implications for their use in both research and educational practice. When
people are asked to report their own levels of curiosity or interest or rate the curiosity or
interest of others (e.g. when educators rate their student’s interest/curiosity levels), it is likely
that their conceptions of curiosity and interest are in line with their commonsense understand-
ing. For example, when students rate their interest in a topic, they are likely to report their rate
of relaxed, pleasurable engagement with the topic, whereas if they are rating their curiosity,
they may be rating a more urgent feeling to search for information. If one is designing
educational interventions based on promoting curiosity or interest, these can be designed with
the commonsense understanding underlying both student and educator’s conception of the
terms in mind. This can allow for better targeting of interventions, and better communication
by researchers of precisely what is to be promoted.
Complementing Theoretical Distinctions
This empirically derived consensus complements previous theoretical distinctions made in the
literature, especially the theoretical analyses provided in the 2019 special issue of Educational
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Psychology Review. Along with Ainley (2019), we agree that trait-level distinctions (based on
individual differences) are far more straightforward than state-level experiential distinctions.
We note that there are a lot of common experiential features of curiosity and interest (see
“Common Features of Curiosity and Interest” above), which accords well with the view of
Ainley (2019) and Murayama et al., (2019), but we suggest that there is some basis to perhaps
distinguish state curiosity and situational interest as representing different experiential states.
The consensus also fits well with Peterson and Cohen’s (2019), Pekrun’s (2019), Shin and
Kim’s (2019) and Alexander’s (2019) distinction that curiosity is singularly urgently focused
on closing an information gap and so is short-lived, while interest is not focused on informa-
tion gaps and can be both short-lived (e.g. situational interest) and long-term (e.g. individual
interest). Along with Shin and Kim (2019) and Hidi & Renninger et al. (2019), we argue that
there are some grounds to distinguish curiosity and interest on the basis of affective experience
(and to a lesser extent incentive salience), but along with Alexander (2019), that it is not
necessarily the case that curiosity must have an aversive component. Unlike Hidi & Renninger
et al. (2019) and Shin and Kim (2019) we did not find evidence to suggest that the non-expert
consensus holds that curiosity and interest have different triggers (as discussed above).
Limitations and Future Directions
Although our method yielded meaningfully interpretable distinctions between definitions of
curiosity and interest, there were exceptions. Some words (e.g. “happen”, “sometime(s)”,
“live”, “other”, “without”, “go”, “get”, “person”, “may”, “good”, “something”) did not
provide straightforward theory-driven meaningful distinctions, despite being utilised for clas-
sification. These perhaps reflect linguistic differences between when people describe curiosity
and interest (Silvia, 2006). This underlies the importance of conducting empirical work, and
not to simply assume distinctions exist because the terms are used in different contexts.
Our work should complement contextually rich qualitative work. We use quantitative
methods (based on word counts) to complement qualitative methods such as thematic analysis
(e.g. Aslan et al., under review), providing a convergent basis for consensus. These methods
represent different trade-offs between bias-reduction and interpretative richness; our quantita-
tive analysis reduces bias but provides less rich interpretation, whereas qualitative approaches
increase bias but provide richer interpretation (e.g. contextual information). Word collocations
provide some contextual information (as a proxy for qualitatively establishing their context),
but we acknowledge that word counts are not contextually rich. An alternative approach could
be to conduct in-depth structured interviews to provide contextually rich information on
people’s beliefs about curiosity and interest, such as those used in studies of children’s naïve
theories about biology (e.g. Legare et al., 2009). Other complementary quantitative techniques
from natural language processing research may also help shed light on people’s understanding
of the concepts. In particular, latent semantic analysis could assess the ways in which
participants believe curiosity and interest are similar (see Forster & Dunbar, 2009; Laham,
1997).
Despite variation in how different both expert and non-experts rated curiosity and interest,
these ratings did not predict classifier accuracy; higher accuracy was not associated with
people rating the concepts as less interchangeable. The descriptive consensus on distinctive-
ness could be dissonant from people’s beliefs about distinctions, i.e. people can describe
differences, but do not believe in distinction. Alternatively, there may be core distinctions, but
also a wider set subscribed to by a minority who believe the terms are more distinct. Plausibly,
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less well-subscribed to distinctions were not used in classification (i.e. core distinctions were
more reliable), thus accuracy would be immune to beliefs about wider differences. Further-
more, it is possible that because participants were informed that we were interested in
similarities and differences between the terms, and provided responses in a relatively short
amount of time (compared to structured interviews) they may have emphasised differences
between the concepts in their definitions (which were picked up by the classifier), even while
believing them to be broadly similar. Future work is needed to investigate the relation between
people’s explicit beliefs about differences, and how this aligns with tendencies to distinguish
curiosity and interest.
Avoiding construct underrepresentation, we simply prompted participants to “define curi-
osity/interest”, and did not ask about experiences. The classifier therefore may be biased to
using trait-level over state-level distinctions. However, in practice our classifier was not
overly-sensitive to trait-level distinctions, accurately classifying definitions from participants
asked to define more momentary experiences (additional data; “being interested in/curious
about X”) as well as those who were not (main test data and expert data). Nevertheless, the list
of word stems used by the classifier may not represent the full range of state-level distinctions
forming the consensus, due to a combination of two factors; (1) the relative ease of using trait-
level distinctions to distinguish curiosity from interest, and (2) feature selection optimising
accuracy with fewer word stems. Therefore, the classifier may prefer trait-level distinctions
(as more valuable for discrimination) over state-level distinctions (as less valuable) to meet
requirements for parsimony. While state-level distinctions were present (discussed above),
further state-level distinctions inherent in the shared consensus may have been overlooked by
feature selection in favour of trait-level ones. Future study should therefore determine if the
consensus about experiential distinctions between curiosity and interest is broader than
outlined.
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